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Abstract
I examine optimal monetary policy in a Lagos and Wright [A uniﬁed framework
for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Econ. 113 (2005) 463—484] model
where trade is centralized and all exchange is voluntary. I identify a class of incentive-
feasible policies that improve welfare beyond what is achievable with zero interven-
tion. Any policy in this class necessarily entails a non-negative inﬂation rate and
a strictly positive nominal interest rate. Despite the absence of a lump-sum tax
instrument, there exists an incentive-feasible policy that implements the ﬁrst-best
allocation.
Key words: Money; Interest; Friedman rule; Voluntary trade; Incentive-feasible
policies; Eﬃcient implementation. JEL codes: E4, E5.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
I examine optimal monetary policy in a version of the Lagos-Wright [7] model
where trade among individuals is competitive; see also Rocheteau and Wright
[8]. Absent policy intervention, the competitive monetary equilibrium is inef-
ﬁcient. That is, the real rate of return on money is too low; so that individuals
are motivated to economize excessively (from a social perspective) on their
real money balances. Eﬃciency is restored when the real rate of return on
money is equated to the rate of time-preference (the Friedman rule).
It is standard in this literature to assume that the government has the ability
to levy lump-sum taxes. Because money is generally superneutral when it is
introduced by way of interest, the Friedman rule may be implemented with
virtually any inﬂation rate when a lump-sum tax instrument is available. This
may be accomplished, for example, with zero inﬂation and a positive nominal
interest rate; where interest payments are ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax. Alter-
natively, it may be accomplished with deﬂation and a zero nominal interest
Preprint submitted to Elsevier Science July 29, 2009rate; where the deﬂation ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax that is used to contract
the money supply. That is, interest-bearing money is not essential when a
lump-sum tax instrument is available. 1
In environments where all trade is restricted to be voluntary—including those
involving people and their government—lump-sum taxation is unavailable as a
policy instrument. The question of interest here is what this restriction im-
plies in terms of eﬃcient implementation. A reasonable conjecture is that the
constrained-eﬃcient policy entails zero intervention (at least, this was my own
prior). But I demonstrate below that this in fact not the case; i.e., there exist
policies that can strictly improve on the allocation associated with zero inter-
vention. Indeed, I demonstrate that the Friedman rule remains implementable
under a suitably designed policy.
Naturally, voluntary trade imposes restrictions on the design of an optimal
policy. In particular, policies are constrained to be incentive-feasible in that
lump-sum payments, if they are to be made, must respect individual rational-
ity. I demonstrate that the standard prescription of deﬂating at the rate of
time-preference is not an incentive-feasible policy. In particular, in the class of
incentive-feasible policies I study, a welfare-improving policy necessarily en-
tails a non-negative inﬂation rate and a strictly positive nominal interest rate.
It is in this sense then that interest-bearing money (and inﬂation) is essential;
at least, in the version of the Lagos-Wright model that I study below.
2 Environment
There is a nonatomic measure of inﬁnitely-lived individuals  ∈ [01] Time is
discrete;  =0 12∞ and, following Lagos and Wright [7], there are two
subperiods at each date labeled day and night. A distinct nonstorable output
is produced and consumed in each subperiod and people meet in a central
location at every point in time. 2
Let () ∈ R denote the consumption of output during the day in period  by
individual  (a negative quantity is interpreted as production). As this output
is nonstorable, an aggregate resource constraint implies
Z
() ≤ 0 (1)
1 Nor, one might add, is ﬁat money essential. The ability to lump-sum tax implies
that the government has ownership and control over a real asset (e.g., human cap-
ital). The government could, in this case, issue paper that is fully backed by the
revenue stream generated by this asset.
2 This is in contrast to the original Lagos and Wright [4] formulation where trade
is “centralized” in one subperiod and “decentralized” in the other.
2for all  ≥ 0 Let {() ()} ∈ R2
+ denote consumption and production,
respectively, of output at night in period  by individual  As this output too





for all  ≥ 0
I n d i v i d u a l sh a v ep r e f e r e n c e st h a ta r el i n e a ri n() At the beginning of every
night, each individual experiences an idiosyncratic shock that determines their
type for the night. There are three possible types. A consumer has a desire
to consume and an inability to produce. The utility ﬂow for a consumer is
given by (()) where 00  0  0 0(0) = ∞ and (0) = 0 A producer
has an ability to produce and no desire to consume. The utility ﬂow for a
producer is given by −(()) where 0 00  0 0(0)  ∞ and (0) = 0 An
inactive individual has neither a desire to consume nor an ability to produce.
The utility ﬂow associated with inactivity is normalized to zero.
An individual is inactive with probability 1 − 2 (0 ≤ 12) and is oth-
erwise a consumer or producer with equal probability. For each individual,
the stochastic process determining types is i.i.d. across time and at each date
there is a measure  of consumers and a measure  of producers. The utility





 {()+[(()) − (())]} (3)
where 0 1
Weighting all individuals equally, a planner maximizes (3) subject to the re-
source constraints (1) and (2). As utility is linear in () individuals are in-
diﬀerent across any lottery over {(): ≥ 0} that delivers a given expected
value. Without loss of generality, a planner may set ()=0for all  and
all  ≥ 0 Since  is strictly convex, all producers will be required to produce
t h es a m el e v e lo fo u t p u t ≥ 0 Given the strict concavity of  all consumers
will be allocated the same level of consumption  ≥ 0 As the population of
active individuals divided equally among producers and consumers at night,
the resource constraint (2) implies  =  It follows that, conditional on a
given level of  (and invoking the fact that  [()] = 0), ex ante welfare is
represented by
()=(1 − )
−1 [() − ()] (4)






In what follows, I refer to ∗ as the ﬁrst-best allocation. Associated with this
allocation is any lottery over () that generates  [()] = 0
3I want to impose restrictions on this environment that will render ﬁat money
essential. First, there is no commitment or coercion; so that all exchanges—
including exchanges involving people and their government—are restricted to
be sequentially rational (individually rational at every point in time). Among
other things, this rules out the use of coercive lump-sum tax instruments. 3
Second, individuals are anonymous in the sense that their personal trading
histories are not monitored. This second restriction, together with the ﬁrst,
rules out private debt. Third, I assume that only society (the government)
can create durable, divisible, and non-counterfeitable tokens. This third re-
striction, together with the second, implies that the economy’s record-keeping
technology is limited to what can be achieved with the use of these tokens. Fi-
nally, I restrict trade among individuals to occur in competitive spot markets
(though exchange between individuals and the government is not restricted in
this manner). 4
3 Individual decision-making
Individuals begin time endowed with the economy’s supply of tokens; which,
anticipating their use as a medium of exchange, will henceforth be labeled
money.L e t(1 2) denote the (non-zero and ﬁnite) price of money in the day
and night markets, respectively.
Government policy will be explained in detail below, but it will be useful to
describe here the aspects of policy that are relevant for individual decision-
making. The government’s policy rule operates at the beginning of the day,
prior to day-market trading. An individual who enters the day with money
balances  has the option of approaching a “government counter” and trans-
forming these balances into − units of money. If 1 and 0 then
money here is like an interest-bearing bond subject to a ﬂat redemption fee. If
an individual declines the redemption option, he simply enters the day-market
with  units of money. 5
Following day-market activity, individuals carry money into the night and
realize their types (whether producer, consumer, or inactive). Subsequent to
3 It does not, however, rule out the use of distortionary taxes. These taxes are
voluntary in the sense that the tax obligation can be avoided by choosing not to
engage in the activity being taxed. In what follows, I abstract from distortionary
taxation as the use of such instruments alone cannot improve welfare.
4 The restriction to competitive trade is not innocuous; see, for example, Hu, Ken-
nan and Wallace [4]).
5 Andolfatto [1] and Hu, Kennan and Wallace [4] interpret  as a voluntary lump-
sum tax. In these latter papers, an agent may avoid a lump-sum tax by not partic-
ipating in trade. In this sense, the lump-sum tax in these latter papers resembles a
“market participation fee,” rather than the redemption fee modeled here.
4night-market activity, individuals carry any remaining money balances for-
ward to the next day, where they are once again presented with the option of
redeeming their money for interest.
3.1 The day-market
Let 1 ≥ 0 denote an individual’s money balances at the beginning of a day;
and let 2 ≥ 0 denote the money balances carried forward into the night.
Let  ∈ [01] denote the probability of exercising the redemption option.
Subsequent to the redemption choice, the individual is free to purchase or
sell output (utility)  at the going market price 1; so that the day budget
constraint is given by  = 1 [(1 − )+( 1− )1 − 2] Deﬁne the real
quantities 1 ≡ 11 and 2 ≡ 22 As well, let  ≡ 1 and deﬁne  ≡ 12
The day budget constraint can now expressed as
 = (1 − )+( 1− )1 − 2 (6)
I seek a recursive representation of the choice problem. Let (1) represent
the individual’s maximum value function at the beginning of the day with real
money balances 1 ≥ 0; and let (2) represent the individual’s maximum
value function at the beginning of the night (prior to realizing his type) with
real money balances 0 ≤ 2 ≤ ; where  is an arbitrarily large, but ﬁnite,
upper bound. These two value functions must satisfy the following recursion
(1) ≡ max
2 {(1 − )+( 1− )1 − 2 + (2)} (7)
I make the following assumption:
[A1] The function  : R+ → R satisﬁes 00  0  0 and  0(0)
Naturally, as  and  are equilibrium objects, I will have to verify later on
that the properties assumed in [A1] are in fact valid.
The quasi-linear environment simpliﬁes matters considerably. In particular,
the redemption choice  and money demand 2 can be characterized indepen-
dently of each other. The optimal redemption choice satisﬁes
 =1 if ( − 1)1 
 ∈ [01] if ( − 1)1 = 
 =0 if ( − 1)1 
(8)
It follows that if 1 and 0 then only individuals with suﬃciently large
money balances 1 will ﬁnd it optimal to pay the redemption fee 




As in Lagos and Wright [7], the demand for money at this stage is indepen-
dent of initial money holdings 1 so that all individuals enter the night with
identical money balances. However, unlike Lagos and Wright [7], the value






 if ( − 1)1 
1 if ( − 1)1 
(10)
By the Theorem of the Maximum,  is continuous in 1 But if 1 and
0is piece-wise linear (and convex) in 1 and non-diﬀerentiable at the
point 1 =(  − 1)−1
3.2 The night-market
3.2.1 Consumers
Let (2) denote the value associated with being a consumer in possession
of real money balances 2 This money is used to make purchases of output
0 ≤  ≤ ∞ at the prevailing price-level 
−1
2  Hence, future money balances
are given by 
+
1 = 2 −
−1
2  with the restriction that 
+
1 ≥ 0 Expressed in




1 1)(2 − ) ≥ 0 The choice











1 1)(2 − ) ≥ 0
o
(11)
The solution here is at the very least an upper hemi-continuous correspon-
dence; but in what follows, I anticipate that the relevant range for 
+
1 will
fall below the critical value ( − 1)−1 In other words, I anticipate that a
consumer will not ﬁnd it desirable—in equilibrium—to exercise his future re-
demption option. As  is diﬀerentiable below this range, the solution will in
this case constitute a pair of functions. In fact, I will go even further here in as-
suming that the solution to (11) is characterized by a binding debt-constraint;
i.e.,
[A2]  = 2 and 
+
1 =0 
If the conjecture [A2] is valid, then it implies that consumers returning to the
day-market will ﬁnd it optimal not to exercise the redemption option. By the





Let (2) denote the value associated with being inactive and in possession
of real money balances 2 As an inactive individuals neither consume nor





Hence (2) ≡ ((
+




1  ( − 1)−1 whenever 1
If the conjecture [A3] is valid, then it implies that inactive individuals return-
ing to the day-market will ﬁnd it optimal to exercise the redemption option.






Let (2) denote the value associated with being a producer in possession of
real money balances 2 If a producer makes sales of output 0 ≤  ≤ ∞
at the prevailing price-level 
−1









1 1)(2 + ) Clearly, the constraint

+













1 1)(2 + )
o
 (14)
Note that if condition [A3] holds, then producers too must strictly prefer to
exercise their redemption option the next day. The supply of output at night











The ex ante value function associated with entering the night-market with
money balances 2 is given by (2) ≡ (2)+( 1− 2)(2)+(2)






Note that if condition [A2] holds, then the function  essentially inherits the
properties of ; in other words,
Lemma 1 Condition [A2] implies [A1].
7Now, combining (9) with (17) yields  = 0()+(1−)(
+
1 1) Making







1 1)(1 − )]
0() (18)
4 Government policy
Recall that the government’s operating procedure is to intervene at the be-
ginning of each day, prior to day-market trading. The policy rule is to pay
a nominal interest rate  on money balances presented for redemption to
individuals willing to pay the redemption fee 
Let  denote the supply of money during any given period; with − denot-
ing “previous” period’s money supply. Condition [A2] implies that the entire
money supply − is held by producers and inactive individuals at the be-
ginning of the day. Condition [A3] implies that both producers and inactive
individuals will ﬁnd it optimal to pay the redemption fee  Hence, the gov-
ernment has an aggregate interest obligation ( −1)− along with revenues
from redemptions equal to (1 − )
The government may also print new money  − − A feasible government
policy will have to satisfy the government budget constraint, ( − 1)− =
 − − +( 1− ); or

− =  +( 1− )
Let  denote the (gross) rate of money supply expansion, so that  = −
The government budget constraint can now be expressed as  =(  −
1)(1 − )−1 Multiply both sides of this latter expression by 1 and note
that 1 ≡ 2 Hence, the government budget constraint may alternatively
be expressed in real terms by
 =(  − 1)(1 − )
−12 (19)
In what follows, I refer to () as a government policy. An incentive-feasible
policy is a government policy that satisﬁes (19), together with conditions [A2]
and [A3].
5 Equilibrium
In this section, I characterize the steady-state monetary equilibrium given an
incentive-feasible government policy.
8To begin, market-clearing at night implies  =  and 2 =  or 2 = 
(by condition [A2], consumers exhaust their money balances). As  = + it
follows that 
+
2 2 =1  Moreover, as  = 
+ and 1 ≡ 2 it follows that

+
1 1 =1  as well. These results, together with condition (18), imply

0()=[ 1− (1 − )]
0() (20)
Condition (20) characterizes the equilibrium level of night-market output 
conditional on an incentive-feasible policy  ≡ 





With () so determined, condition (19) delivers (utilizing the condition 2 =
) an expression for the equilibrium redemption fee
 =(  − 1)(1 − )
−1 (22)
Next, I derive the equilibrium distribution of real money balances at the be-
ginning of the day. By condition [A2], 
+
1 =0for consumers. As inactive
individuals neither consume nor produce, 
+
1 =( ) And as producers
augment their money balances by sales to consumers, 
+
1 =( )2 Hence,
the steady-state distribution for 1 is given by
(1)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 for 0 ≤ 1  ()
1 −  for () ≤ 1  ()2
1 for ()2 ≤ 1  ∞
(23)
Finally, combine the equilibrium objects above with the budget constraint (6)
to derive the consumption allocation across types in each day. For those who
were consumers in the previous night,  =0and 1 =0 ;so that
 = − (24)







 −  (25)







 −  (26)
One can easily verify that the population-weighted sum of (24), (25) and (26)
is equal to zero.
95.1 Zero intervention
Zero intervention ( =  =1 )is trivially an incentive-feasible policy. Such a
policy implies  =1 ;which, by condition (20) determines an equilibrium level
of output 0  0  ∗ In a monetary equilibrium, the debt-constraint for
consumers will bind tightly so that [A2] holds. Condition [A3] is irrelevant
here, as  =1 
In fact, it should be clear that there exists a class of incentive-feasible policies
() satisfying  =  =1and 1 that implements the zero intervention
allocation 0 as an equilibrium. That is, as the real rate of return on money
remains unchanged, the debt-constraint for consumers binds as before; so that
[A2] holds. As the government’s interest obligation is in this case ﬁnanced
entirely by new money creation, the equilibrium fee in this case is zero. As
inactive individuals and producers carry strictly positive money balances into
the day, condition [A3] must necessarily hold when  =0  It follows that
money is superneutral when it is introduced in the form of interest.
6 Welfare-improving incentive-feasible policies
The interesting question, of course, is whether it might be possible to imple-
ment an allocation that improves upon 0 As ex ante welfare () is strictly
increasing in  over the range [0 ∗) and as (20) implicitly deﬁnes a func-
tion ˆ () that is strictly increasing in  I restrict attention to policies that
satisfy 1 In addition, I restrict attention to policies that satisfy   1;
since otherwise, a monetary equilibrium will fail to exist. 6 Together then, the
r e l e v a n tr a n g eo fp o l i c i e si sg i v e nb y
1 
−1 (27)
Note that for any such policy, condition (22) implies that 0 That is, it is
critical that the government’s interest obligation not be ﬁnanced entirely by
money creation.
The characterization of equilibrium derived earlier is predicated on the validity
of [A2] and [A3]. I now turn to checking the validity of these assumptions
for any given policy () satisfying (27) and (22).
Consider ﬁrst [A3], which asserts that individuals who are inactive at night
will ﬁnd it optimal to exercise the redemption option the next day. In the pro-
posed equilibrium, inactive individuals enter the day-market with real money
balances 1 =( ) By (8), exercising the redemption option is (strictly)
preferred if and only if ( − 1)() ; or, by appealing to (22), if and












Simplifying, we have the following restriction

∙ 1 − 
1 − 
¸
 1 for 1 (28)
Condition (28) implies that deﬂationary policies are not incentive-feasible. In
particular, the “standard” Friedman rule prescription of setting ()=( 1 )
is not incentive-feasible. Under this latter policy, the implied lump-sum tax
 (redemption fee) would not be willingly paid by any individual, so that
a contraction of the money supply impossible. Of course, since  ≡  it
follows that 1 will be a necessary property of any welfare-improving
incentive-feasible policy.
Consider next [A2], which asserts that consumers at night will be debt-
constrained (so that exercising their future redemption option is necessarily
suboptimal). Imagine, by way of contradiction, that consumers are not debt-
constrained; i.e., so that 2  In this case, we must consider the possibility
that consumers carry a suﬃciently large quantity of real money balances for-
ward to make exercising the redemption option optimal. Ignoring a razor’s
edge case, one of two things must be true; i.e.,
Case 1: 
+
1  ( − 1)−1
Case 2: 
+
1  ( − 1)−1
where 
+
1 =( )(2 − )
As consumers are not debt-constrained, their demand for output at night as




1 ); or, by employing
equilibrium prices and quantities, 0()=( )0(
+
1 ) R e f e r r i n gt o( 1 0 ) ,
note that 0(
+
1 )=1in Case 1 and 0(
+
1 )= in Case 2.
Let me consider Case 1 ﬁrst. Appealing to (17), we have 0(2)=() +
(1 − )() Existence of a monetary equilibrium requires that 0  2 
∞ satisfy condition (9), so that
 = () +( 1− )
But this can only be true if  =1 ; a condition that is violated by the fact
that 1 and 1; i.e., see condition (28).
Let me now consider Case 2. Appealing to (17), we have 0(2)= Once
again, existence of a monetary equilibrium requires 0  2  ∞ satisfying
condition (9), so that
 = 
11But this condition is violated by the fact that   1; i.e., see (27).
Thus, for the range of policy parameters considered here, [A2] must hold. It
appears then that for the policy parameters constrained to satisfy (27) and
(28), the conjectured properties [A2] and [A3] are in fact properties of the
(stationary) monetary equilibrium characterized above.
Before concluding this section, there is one other matter that deserves some
attention. The welfare-improving policy rule studied here is nonlinear in the
sense that the real return on money net of the ﬂa tf e ei si n c r e a s i n gi nt h e
quantity of money presented for redemption. What is to prevent a coalition
of individuals with cash on hand at the beginning of the day to pool their
money balances and elect among themselves a representative to exercise the
redemption option on behalf of the group? The preceding analysis implicitly
assumes that such coalitions are infeasible. 7
This assumption, however, is better viewed as a direct implication of the prop-
erties of the environment. In particular, the redemption phase is assumed to
occur prior to day-market trading. This timing assumption prevents any given
individual from collecting a group’s money balances in exchange for output.
Hence, the only way an elected representative can collect money from the
group is in exchange for a promise to return it later (post redemption) with
interest. But as all individuals are anonymous and lack commitment, a repre-
sentative can renege on any such promise with impunity.
T h em a i nc o n c l u s i o nt h e ni ss u m m a r i z e db yt h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o n .
Proposition 1 Under the range of incentive-feasible policies described by (27)
and (28), there exists a stationary monetary equilibrium with an allocation
0  ˆ ()  ∗ characterized by (20).
It follows that any welfare-improving policy necessarily requires strictly pos-
itive inﬂation and nominal interest rates. In addition, since ˆ () % ∗ as
 % 
−1 it follows as a corollary that under an appropriately designed policy,
the equilibrium allocation ˆ () can be made arbitrarily close to the ﬁrst-best.
7 Relation to the literature
My analysis bears some relation to the work of Berentsen, Camera and Waller
[3]. These authors, who examine an environment similar to the one considered
here, also make a case for interest-bearing money. In their model, this is ac-
complished by introducing a “bank” in the day-market that pays interest on
deposits of cash from producers, redirecting these funds to consumers in the
form of interest-bearing loans. For this solution to work, the bank must be
endowed with at least a limited record-keeping technology. While modifying
7 If such coalitions were feasible, then the allocation associated with zero interven-
tion is constrained-eﬃcient.
12the environment in this manner seems entirely reasonable, my Proposition 1
suggests that it is not essential to do so if policy is designed correctly.
Recently, Hu, Kennan and Wallace [4] have examined a Lagos-Wright model
that is similar to my own. Among other things, they discover that ﬁrst-best
implementation is possible without intervention; at least, if individuals are
suﬃciently patient. This result appears to contradict my own claim that an
intervention is necessary to improve welfare. In fact, there is no contradiction
as our respective environments diﬀer in an important way.
The important diﬀerence is that Hu, Kennan and Wallace [4] remain true to
the original Lagos and Wright [7] model by assuming pairwise meetings in
one of the subperiods. The assumption of pairwise meetings essentially grants
maximum freedom in the design of “trading protocols” conducive to eﬃcient
implementation. The search friction places limits on coalition formation; that
is, it eﬀectively imposes a communication barrier between the members of a
match and the rest of the community. As the size of a meeting is increased
(say, by replicating the buyer-seller pair in each meeting), the core converges
to a competitive equilibrium. As in Tsu and Wallace [10], the Hu, Kennan and
Wallace [4] result will fail to hold when trade among individuals is competitive.
T h e r ei so n eo t h e rd i ﬀerence between Hu, Kennan and Wallace [4] and my own
that is worth mentioning. Like myself, these authors also restrict attention to
individually-rational lump-sum taxes; see also Sanches and Williamson [9]. A
relevant issue in these settings concerns the penalty for noncompliance. This
penalty is typically modeled as a threat of exclusion from trade. For example,
in Hu, Kennan and Wallace [4], individuals are free to skip the day-market
(the subperiod in which the tax is levied) and in doing so, they escape the
tax. The penalty for tax avoidance is the personal welfare loss associated
with not having the opportunity to rebalance money holdings during the day.
If this welfare loss is not very large then, in a competitive setting, there is
an incentive-induced lower bound on the rate of deﬂation that renders the
Friedman rule infeasible. 8 As is frequently the case in these settings, including
Hu, Kennan and Wallace [4], better allocations are available for more patient
economies.
In contrast, the government in my environment is unable to prevent partici-
pation in any market. The penalty for noncompliance in my model is simply
the foregone interest that would have been earned in the act of redemption.
As the cost-beneﬁt calculation concerning the redemption choice (8) involves
no intertemporal trade-oﬀ,e ﬃcient implementation in my model turns out to
be independent of the discount factor.
Finally, my results also bear some relation to Kocherlakota’s [6] illiquid (interest-
bearing) bond policy. In Andolfatto [2], I recast Kocherlakota’s [6] argument
8 See Andolfatto [1] and Sanches and Williamson [9].
13in the context of a Lagos-Wright model. 9 A bond issued in the day represents
a risk-free claim to cash the next day and individuals carry money and bonds
into the night-market. An asset-market opens at night, subsequent to the re-
alization of types, but prior to the goods-market at night. Kocherlakota [6]
assumes that the bond is illiquid in the sense that it cannot be used to pur-
chase goods at night. Moreover, he demonstrates that this trading restriction
is necessary to improve welfare. In fact, in [2] I demonstrate that the ﬁrst-best
is implementable with an appropriate choice of the money-bond ratio and in-
ﬂation rate. Eﬃcient implementation necessarily requires a positive inﬂation
rate and a positive nominal interest rate (bonds must trade at a discount).
Hence, in both my paper here and in Kocherlakota [6], an interest-bearing
government asset is essential. Kocherlakota’s illiquid bond policy is attractive
relative to my own in that it constitutes a linear mechanism. On the other
hand, his mechanism can only work if individuals are somehow prohibited
from using bonds as a means of payment. My mechanism has an advantage
in that it does not rely on the imposition of any trading restriction between
individuals.
8C o n c l u s i o n
The Lagos and Wright [7] model constitutes the leading framework of analysis
in the contemporaeneous monetary theory literature. The framework models
individuals exposed to idiosyncratic risk generated by the random arrival of
opportunities to produce and consume output over time. This risk may be
modeled as the outcome of random search in a decentralized market, or it
may be modeled as the outcome of random shocks to preferences and tech-
nologies in a centralized market. Either way, the key simplifying property of
the framework is quasi-linear preferences, which removes the distribution of
wealth as an endogenous state variable.
The modeling choice of centralized versus decentralized trade appears to have
important policy implications. Hu, Kennan and Wallace [4] investigate these
implications when trade is decentralized. My paper investigates these impli-
cations for the case of centralized trade. I identify a class of incentive feasible
policies that improve welfare beyond what achievable with zero intervention.
When all trade is restricted to be voluntary, any such policy in this class ev-
idently requires a strictly positive nominal interest rate and a non-negative
inﬂation rate. The eﬃcient allocation (the Friedman rule) is implementable
for a suitably designed incentive-feasible policy. The traditional prescription
9 As it turns out, an illiquid bond (or type-contingent transfers) can play no welfare-
improving role in the model I study here; see also, Berentsen, Camera and Waller
[3]. In Andolfatto [2], I modify the spatial structure of the environment so that it
corresponds to the one used in Kocherlakota [6].
14of implementing the Friedman rule via deﬂation is not incentive-feasible.
My proposition 1 also has implications for theorists interested in exploring the
foundations of banking in the Lagos-Wright model. For example, the bank-
ing sector modeled in Berentsen, Camera and Waller [3] appears not to be
essential; at least, not under an optimal monetary policy. This suggests that
current formulations of the theory are possibly missing important aspects of
reality that render banking an essential institution in monetary economies.
Discovering precisely what these missing elements might be deserves further
attention.
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